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Commentary
What Is Aesculapian Authority?
Although the concept of Aesculapian authority—the unique authority that accrues to medical pro-
fessionals—has long been implicitly recognized in
human medicine, and explicitly articulated since the
1950s,1 it has not been similarly applied to veterinary
medicine. This is in part a function of the fact that,
until recently, veterinary medicine was primarily and
overwhelmingly focused on the economic value of
animals, usually in agriculture, and that value defined
and circumscribed the degree to which treatment was
accorded to a sick animal. It is only since companion
animal medicine has come to have a major role in vet-
erinary medicine (and society has, to a much lesser
extent, expressed concern about laboratory animals)
that economic value of the animal as a constraint on
expenditure for diagnosis and treatment has been
superseded, and companion animals have come to be
seen more as persons valued for their uniqueness.
Fewer and fewer pet owners would be inclined to
euthanatize Fifi, their pet Beagle, because it is cheap-
er to buy a new Beagle than fix the old one, though
such a mindset would certainly be prevalent in agri-
culture, where animals bear primarily economic
value. Since the early 1980s, for example, it is quite
common for pet owners to spend tens of thousands of
dollars at the Colorado State University veterinary
hospital for cancer treatment. 
In judicial decisions granting emotional damages for
losses of animals and in explicit legislation, society has
begun to acknowledge that companion animals possess
more than market value. Municipal resolutions in San
Francisco and Boulder, Colo, have affirmed the (current-
ly legally indefensible) notion that humans are guardians,
not owners, of companion animals, and numerous legal
scholars are exploring various strategies for raising the
legal status of animals from that of property.
Thus, as society moves away from an economic
conception of companion animals, including horses, to
a notion of family, veterinarians serving that popula-
tion are forced (or, in most cases, given their personal
predilections, are allowed to move) out of what I used
to call a “garage mechanic” model of treating animals
toward a “pediatrician” model. And with this new
model of treating the animal as a direct object of moral
and medical concern, as opposed to a utilitarian object
whose value is overwhelmingly economic, comes
increasing relevance of the concept of Aesculapian
authority to companion animal practice and correlative
relevance of potential abuse of that authority.
What is Aesculapian authority? The locus classi-
cus where the concept is most carefully analyzed is
Siegler and Osmond’s Models of Madness, Models of
Medicine, where Aesculapian authority is discussed in
the context of human physicians.1 According to their
discussion, Aesculapian authority is the uniquely pow-
erful authority vested in those that society perceives as
healers, historically traceable to the time when medi-
cine was inseparable from magic and religion. It is
Aesculapian authority that licenses a medical practi-
tioner to handle a patient with great intimacy.
Physicians may probe all parts of the body of patients
of either gender, with barely a “by your leave”—they
tell a patient they must enter an otherwise forbidden
area rather than ask for permission. Aesculapian
authority confers the sick role, allowing patients to
escape from responsibilities of work, school, or family.
Such authority also compels patients to ingest unpalat-
able medications; change their eating or sleeping
habits; submit to moral lectures on child rearing; sur-
render blood, urine, or fecal material; be immobilized;
undergo surgery preceded by imposed loss of con-
sciousness; or even change their temperament. What
would be dismissed as torture in the absence of
Aesculapian authority is meekly accepted by even the
most powerful in its presence. As one physician once
told me, “As a physician, I can get almost anyone to do
whatever I tell him or her.” 
In fact, argue Siegler and Osmond,1 Aesculapian
authority is far and away the most powerful authority
in society—even kings, politicians, and dictators sub-
mit to medical authority they don’t understand and can
be scolded and ordered about by physicians.
According to Siegler and Osmond,1 this authority
derives from a combination of traits—sapiential (ie,
special wisdom and knowledge), moral (deriving from
the overwhelming moral imperative to heal, relieve
suffering, and retard death), and charismatic (derived
from the fact that medicine is still related to magic in
the eyes of the scientifically and medically naive). The
latter explains why physicians are often threatened by
dealing with medical students, veterinary students, or
veterinarians—they know too much!
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Aesculapian authority is further reinforced by
other members of the medical community as they
rarely choose to call each other by first names around
a patient or directly challenge the pronouncements of
peers.
There are, however, strict limits to such authority.
For example, it must be deployed to further the best
interests of the patient; pursuit of any other end—such
as extracting sexual favors from a patient—represents a
clear-cut case of abuse of that authority. This creates
ever-present moral problems of abuse of authority for
physicians and researchers. 
I believe everything said of physicians increasing-
ly holds true of veterinarians; indeed many human
patients seek medical advice and even assistance from
their veterinarians, who are in fact held in higher
esteem in society than are human medical doctors!a
Veterinarians too confer a sick role on animals and
absolve them of tasks and responsibilities (particularly
companion animals but also working animals),
approach animals in all body parts and areas, perform
operations that may be considered torturous outside of
a medical context, and so on. The only difference, in
fact, is that a veterinarian almost always works through
a third party, the client and owner, whereas physicians
usually work directly with patients. This is certainly
not always true: consider pediatricians or those who
practice gerontology or psychiatry—they too must
often deal with a third party. But the key point is that,
morally speaking, neither pediatricians nor companion
animal veterinarians owe primary allegiance to the
third party; their moral duty is to the patient, they are
obliged by the nature of their profession to act in the
best interest of the patient, and they consequently need
to avoid orders or requests from the third party that are
not in the best interest of the patient.
The major difference, of course, between pediatric
physicians and veterinarians is the fact that the con-
sensus social ethic will back the pediatrician in cir-
cumventing the obstructive third party, as when a par-
ent refuses to allow a child to receive requisite medical
care, courts will order it done. We have not yet reached
that stage with animals. But insofar as the animal
owner claims to be interested first and foremost in the
health of the animal, the situation is logically the same
for a pediatrician and (at least) the companion animal
veterinarian.
Plato2 made a highly relevant point in the Republic
when he pointed out that, conceptually, the primary
obligation of a shepherd is to further the well-being of
the sheep in his purview. The money he makes accrues
to him in his capacity as wage earner and does not take
precedence over his primary obligation. Indeed, this
analogy helps us to understand why we are so morally
horrified at a shepherd who accepts a bribe to hurt or
kill his sheep. By the same token, the veterinarian
treating companion animals that owners view as per-
sons or family members is obliged to give primacy to
the animal.
This is not to deny that veterinary medicine is a
people profession, for not working with the owner for
the benefit of the animal can be a major problem. It is
here that full Aesculapian authority can and should be
invoked for the benefit of the animal. This may involve
all of the elements of Aesculapian authority mentioned
earlier: appeal to knowledge, wisdom, and experience;
appeal to moral authority; and appeal to healer’s charis-
ma. The key point is that veterinary medicine can
require great people skills and more time spent in deal-
ing with owners than with actual diagnostic and thera-
peutic modalities performed on the animal, yet con-
ceptually, the ultimate function and goal of veterinary
medicine can still be the best interests of the animal.
One aspect of Aesculapian authority that has not
been discussed in either human or veterinary medical
contexts derives from concepts developed in the phi-
losophy of language. During the mid-20th century,
Oxford philosopher J. L. Austin3 (as well as numerous
other linguistically oriented philosophers, including
Wittgenstein) called attention to hitherto unnoticed
dimensions of language beyond the descriptive—that
is, beyond the uttering of descriptive statements that
are true or false. In particular, Austin stressed the con-
cept of performative utterances whereby a speaker, by
virtue of his or her social role, performs an action
beyond the linguistic when saying certain words.
Examples abound. When an umpire says, “You’re out,”
you are out, even if later examination of videotapes
shows that you are factually safe. When a king says you
are banished, you’d best be out of the kingdom forth-
with. When a minister says, “I now pronounce you
man and wife,” only complex legal machinations can
cancel the resulting state. And so on.
The ability to create powerful performative utter-
ances accrues naturally to those possessed of
Aesculapian authority. A physician or veterinarian is
required to declare one sick and thereby create the sick
role, with all its attendant removal of responsibility for
person or animal. A psychiatrist who declares a person
a possible danger to himself or others thereby creates
indefinite commitment for a person without appeal,
something even judges cannot do. A declaration from a
public health veterinarian regarding foot-and-mouth
disease, rabies, or bovine spongiform encephalopathy
can effectively doom thousands of animals to death
with no appeal.
Even outside the complex tissue of social regula-
tions, a physician or veterinarian can create uniquely
powerful performative utterances. We have all heard of
people who, when told by a physician, “you have only
six months to live,” will obligingly die during that peri-
od (whereas others, less trustful of physicians, will
make it a point to confute that prognosis). The same
holds true of “you will never walk again” or “your ani-
mal will never walk again.” To put it simply, for at least
some people, a pronouncement made from a base of
Aesculapian authority by a physician or a veterinarian
becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy. Even if the veteri-
narian is physiologically wrong, many clients will not,
after that pronouncement, attempt to have the animal
walk, thereby, through lack of attempt or through sub-
sequent muscle atrophy, validating the prognostica-
tion!
It follows from this discussion that Aesculapian
authority is an extremely powerful notion and, like any
other power, is subject to abuse. We are not interested
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in deliberate, self-conscious, intentional abuse, such as
using that authority to extract sexual favors or money
from patients or, in the case of veterinary medicine,
from clients. We are rather concerned with the uncon-
scious, nondeliberate abuse of this most powerful of
authorities in virtue of lack of reflection on it, oblivi-
ousness to its full extent or influence, failure to recog-
nize it is being deployed where it shouldn’t be, or,
equally pernicious, that it is not being deployed when
it should. In what follows, we shall chronicle some
examples of this sort of nondeliberate abuse of
Aesculapian authority in the hope of making veterinar-
ians more aware of this notion and its dangers.
Issues of Euthanasia
Probably the most common issues surrounding
Aesculapian authority in veterinary medicine devolve
around medical and convenience euthanasia. These
issues come from two problems—clients who demand
euthanasia for trivial reasons and clients who refuse
euthanasia despite its being medically indicated to end
suffering. Historically, the issue of greatest concern to
veterinarians related to euthanasia has involved
requests to perform convenience euthanasia for rea-
sons the veterinarian perceives as unacceptable.
Discussions with veterinarians and humane society
workers reveal that pet owners may request euthanasia
for appalling reasons: the animal no longer matches the
color scheme; we are going on vacation and it is cheap-
er to get a new animal than to board it; the animal is
getting old and can no longer run with me.
Veterinarians who lean toward the pediatrician
model report that being asked to euthanatize healthy—
potentially healthy—animals is one of the most odious
aspects of their job. Indeed, constantly performing
such euthanasias is highly erosive of physical and men-
tal health by virtue of the stress it engenders. It is moral
stress4 based in a fundamental and inescapable belief
that what you are doing is totally inimical to your pro-
fessional reason for being, as you are asked to destroy
healthy functional beings, many of whom you may
have worked to save in the past.
Ordinary stress management techniques do not
touch that stress. And if you are morally conscientious,
it does not help much to send these clients packing, for
you believe that someone will kill the animal for them.
I have argued that the only escape from moral stress in
the context of demands for convenience euthanasia is
to do everything in one’s power to save that animal,
including exerting one’s Aesculapian authority as
forcefully as possible. Unfortunately, too many veteri-
narians, having been trained in a context where the
mechanic model was prevalent, however much they
may personally lean toward the moral primacy of ani-
mal interests, will perform the euthanasia. This leads
not only to spirally escalating moral stress but helps
perpetuate client expectations regarding the viability
and moral acceptability of convenience euthanasia.
In short, I am arguing that failure to wield one’s
Aesculapian authority to save the life of an animal by
acquiescing to requests for convenience euthanasia
represents a substantial moral problem in veterinary
medicine. This in turn cheapens animal life in the eyes
of the public and validates irresponsibility. Failing to
act is a form of acting, generating bad consequences for
animals, society, individual veterinarians, and veteri-
nary medicine in general.
Ironically, in many cases of convenience euthana-
sia, the veterinarian can save the animal if he or she
uses the authority inherent in the healer role. If the
euthanasia is for behavior problems, the veterinarian
can recommend retraining, behavior modification, or
pharmacologic intervention. If euthanasia is requested
for the sort of bad reasons cited, the veterinarian can
forthrightly indicate that he or she did not get a veteri-
nary education to destroy healthy animals and can sug-
gest other options—fostering, adoption, and so on. In
my view, there is nothing wrong with a veterinarian
educating a client regarding the ethical unacceptability
of convenience euthanasia any more than there is any-
thing wrong with pediatricians counseling against
child abuse. 
To accomplish these goals requires that veterinari-
ans become consciously aware of their Aesculapian
authority and learn to consciously deploy it. This in
turn requires recognition and discussion of that
authority by the veterinary community and incorpora-
tion of these issues into veterinary school curricula and
continuing education.
It is likely that as society continues to evolve in the
direction of what I have elsewhere called the “new
ethic for animals,”5 the issue of convenience euthana-
sia will gradually be mitigated, for societal disapproval
of such euthanasia will help shape behavior, and edu-
cation will influence subsequent generations. It is also
not inconceivable that legislation growing out of this
new ethic will make it more difficult to get rid of an
animal. There is an analogy here with the rapid and
revolutionary changes in social thought and behavior
with regard to despoliation and preservation of the
environment. In the 1960s, environmental concern
was not a social issue; by 1970, we had experienced the
first Earth Day.
Meanwhile, as more and more people in society
profess to view their animals as members of the family,
another and opposite problem for veterinarians has
emerged.6 There are now ever-increasing numbers of
people unwilling to surrender their animals to disease
and sometimes unwilling to authorize medical
euthanasia despite the animal’s poor prognosis and
high degree of suffering. Since the late 1970s, people
have been spending large amounts of money on their
companion animals’ health, which has in turn driven
the development of practices in oncology, surgery, car-
diology, and other specialty fields. Such commitment
to one’s animals is often laudable but sometimes is
pathologic and selfish, as when owners refuse to accept
that the animal is in such a state of suffering that
euthanasia is the moral course of choice yet are unwill-
ing to let go because of their own emotional needs.
Thus, in a given day, a morally aware veterinarian may
face one client who wants a perfectly healthy dog killed
and another who will not consider euthanasia of a ter-
minally ill animal in pain.
This new attachment to animals is quite under-
standable. As divorces increase, as people live longer
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and longer, as our culture gets increasingly urban,
loneliness grows epidemic, and the love and reciprocal
care once provided in extended families vanish. An
animal may be the only being to fill the human need
for giving and receiving love or may be the only reason
an elderly person has to wake up in the morning.
Under such circumstances, it is easy to understand the
temptation to keep the animal alive at all costs.
Nonetheless, this raises a major problem for the veteri-
narian who sees his or her primary responsibility as
serving the best interests of the animal.
It is true that reasons once believed definitive for
justifying euthanasia have now been supplanted.
Whereas, for example, amputation of a limb was
believed to cause sufficient suffering and inadequacy
for the animal as to justify euthanasia for the sake of
the animal’s welfare, we now realize that this is not the
case. Such advances notwithstanding, however, it is
well to remember that an animal consumed by pain
may be incapable of fulfilling its nature and of being
happy. Humans tell us that when they are in chronic,
unalleviable pain, they are the pain; their other roles—
parent, professional, friend, lover—are subordinated to
the pain. How much the more so, then, for an animal
that, lacking hope, cannot even imagine an end to the
pain?7
Should veterinary students be taught that they are
not to direct clients toward euthanasia? It is claimed
that a clinician who does so or even answers the ques-
tion “what would you do?” is being paternalistic and
directive and will likely be rejected by the client later
with “you made me kill my dog.” The client must make
his or her own decision.
In my view, this is a grievous and mischievous
error. One would not ask a client’s opinion on what
antibiotic or surgical approach to use. The same logic
holds for euthanasia, which is, for the veterinarian
adopting the pediatrician model, the ultimate treat-
ment for otherwise unalleviable suffering. One would
hope that veterinary education prepares a professional
to judge when that situation is the case better than a
layperson can. Thus, if one is committed to the best
interests of the animal, one should not surrender
deployment of the ultimate treatment for suffering to
the clients, especially when they are focused on their
own interests (ie, fear of loss of the animal on which
they emotionally depend).
Thus, it is well within the role of veterinarian as
healing professional to deploy his or her Aesculapian
authority to keep a healthy animal alive; medicine aims
at restoring or maintaining healthy living. Similarly, it
is also conceptually part of the veterinarian’s duty to
end suffering totally erosive of the animal’s quality of
life. By no means should one be insensitive to the
client’s putative reasons for wanting to kill a healthy
animal or keep alive a suffering one. But being sensi-
tive to these reasons—and using one’s Aesculapian
authority to do so—does not mean that one should
abrogate serving the best interests of the animal. It sim-
ply means learning to communicate that requirement
to a client in a way that helps ease them. In the event
that even Aesculapian authority cannot move the client
to euthanasia, it should be deployed to convince the
client to acquiesce to heroic pain control, which may in
the end be tantamount to euthanasia yet easier to
accomplish.
In our discussion thus far we have presupposed a
long-term relationship between client and clinician,
which sometimes makes it easier for the doctor to exert
Aesculapian authority. But such a long-term relation-
ship is not essential for such authority or presupposi-
tional to it. A surgeon someone sees for moments
before and after an operation may enjoy greater
Aesculapian authority over a patient or client than a
medical professional who is also a family friend. Thus
a critical care veterinarian, encountering a client he or
she does not know, is unsullied by intimate knowledge
of client emotional reliance on the animal and can say
“it is time to stop trying” with greater lack of ambigui-
ty and ambivalence than can the veterinarian whose
attention is focused in part on the human and who
thus may be more sympathetic toward resolution of the
situation not in the best interests of the animal.
Another problem relating to improper use of
Aesculapian authority can arise when the clinician is
also a researcher, as is the case with some oncologists
whose research is performed on client-owned animals.
This is a laudable approach to making progress in bio-
medicine, for it is far less problematic to use naturally
existing disease than to create it in healthy animals. Yet
such research runs the risk of the clinician’s confusing
roles.
As a clinician, the veterinarian’s primary obligation
is to the best interests of the animal. As a researcher,
however, the veterinarian’s primary obligation is to
extract the most data from the experiment. These two
functions may conflict when, qua researcher, the vet-
erinarian is tempted to keep the suffering animal alive
as long as possible to glean additional knowledge from
the case. Yet qua clinician, the veterinarian knows that
his or her obligation is to end the suffering. The same
conflict is evident in the Veterinarian’s Oath when one
is asked to commit to advancing medical knowledge
yet also to alleviating animal suffering. Danger exists
when the veterinarian uses his or her Aesculapian
authority with clients to move them toward prolonging
life when the animal is suffering. Clinicians should not
use their Aesculapian authority to justify actions that
do not directly benefit their patients. 
The Problem of Informed Consent
Similar problems may arise in human and veteri-
nary medical research with regard to enrolling research
subjects in clinical protocols. A physician surgeon
involved in research once told me that in his view,
there is often no real informed consent in such
research. The same could hold true in veterinary
research.
Guarding against this abuse of Aesculapian
authority is difficult—and more difficult, ironically
enough, for a client’s companion animal being used in
clinical research than for a research animal owned by
the researcher. In the latter case, animal care and use
committees demand end points for the research to con-
trol animal suffering. Such end points are almost
always set before the advent of major pain or distress.
Yet, in the case of clinical research, the end point may
be left to the animal owner who, unlike the committee,
may well confound the veterinarian researcher’s sepa-
rate and distinct roles as healer and researcher.
Problems Arising Out of Confusing Wage
Earner and Healer
As mentioned, Plato points out that one’s role as a
healer should be kept separate from one’s role as a wage
earner, with the interests of the patient taking prece-
dence. This distinction is easier to maintain in theory
than in practice and may well become blurred, leading
to abuse of Aesculapian authority. An example would be
when you recommend an expensive diet that you stock
to a client for a temporary usage, yet when the animal no
longer needs the diet, you never explicitly tell the client
that a different diet will work just as well. You are cer-
tainly not getting wealthy by virtue of your authority,
but you are prolonging unnecessary expenditure. A sim-
ilar point can be made with regard to recommending or
even raising the issue of heartworm medicaments in an
area where heartworm infection is unlikely.
Problems of Alternative Medicine
An emerging issue of Aesculapian authority is the
degree to which that authority can be used to recom-
mend treatments to clients or, more subtly, to validate
their demands for such treatments. Consider the sce-
nario of patients who believe the physician is holding
something back that will cure or alleviate their symp-
toms. This paranoia seems to be common in society,
and people are gravitating toward all sorts of clinically
unproven regimens.8 
Billions of dollars are spent annually on such nos-
trums, despite the fact that many were empirically dis-
credited a century or more ago. There are good reasons
for public disaffection with science-based medicine—
neglect by that tradition of psychological dimensions
of sickness, failure of science-based physicians to focus
on unique elements of disease embodied in a unique
individual in favor of the law-like, iatrogenic problems
coming out of medicine, the high cost of medication
and medical care, the emphasis on cure over care, pro-
longation of life without regard to its quality, and so on.
Such problems lead some of us to a search for simple
solutions to medical problems. A sort of good old days
mentality seizes some people’s imaginations, and they
yearn for natural or spiritual remedies, forgetting that
arsenic, prions, and snake venom are all natural with-
out thereby being healthful or even innocuous.
In any case, client demands for such treatments
have increased to a fever pitch, pressure for veterinari-
ans to supply them is overwhelming, and clients are
willing to pay! Further, in some cases the disease you
are to treat is in the client’s imagination—they come to
you for companionship, advice, counseling, or friend-
ship under the aegis of having a sick animal. So what is
the harm in prescribing alternative therapies that pro-
vide hope for clients, give them what they want, or
may have a positive placebo effect, provided such
remedies do no harm? Why shouldn’t we place our
Aesculapian authority behind these unproven reme-
dies?
Many clinicians have begun to provide such ther-
apies for a variety of reasons. These include: “The
clients demand them” and “They will get them from
somewhere; it might as well be me.” Yet the concept of
Aesculapian authority is seriously impeded by such
reasoning, for one of the sources of that authority is
one’s medical expertise, based in the best knowledge
one can garner. If one prostitutes that authority to
endorse nonremedies posing as remedies, it can well
lead to erosion of that authority, particularly when the
social pendulum swings, as it inevitably will, away
from fascination with therapies that have no basis in
proof of efficacy and are, in many cases, incompatible
with what we know of nature. Like one’s reputation for
veracity, medical credibility, once lost, is difficult to
regain.
We may seek some guidance from the American
Academy of Pediatrics, a highly relevant group of pro-
fessionals who have examined this issue and whose
results are clearly highly relevant for veterinarians who
embrace the pediatrician model. In a recent publication,
the American Academy of Pediatrics Committee on
Children with Disabilities has developed guidelines for
“Counseling Families Who Choose Complementary
and Alternative Medicine for Their Child With Chronic
Illness or Disability.”9 These guidelines conceptually
address many often-neglected aspects of disease and
treatment. While acknowledging that all medical thera-
pies, conventional or alternative, should be science-
and evidence-based, the guidelines wrestle sympatheti-
cally with the mindset leading desperate people to seek
such therapies.
These guidelines stress the need for medical pro-
fessionals not to relinquish their ability to influence
treatment and serve the best interests of the child, that
is, to retain their Aesculapian authority in their rela-
tionship with parents. That does not mean endorsing
therapies that might be dangerous, but it does mean
not relinquishing one’s medical purview over the child.
That in turn means being extremely sensitive to
parental frustration, desperation, and overwhelming
desire to do something. The practitioner should study
the alternative modality sought by the client, critically
evaluate the scientific basis of and evidence for the
therapy in a sympathetic way, and forthrightly explain
the likelihood of success as he or she sees it. This is
likely to entail a discussion of types of evidence, the
weakness of anecdote, or the compatibility with
known laws of nature. Even more important, he or she
should communicate possible dangers of these thera-
pies:
Alternative therapies may be directly harmful by
causing direct toxic effects, compromising adequate
nutrition, interrupting beneficial medications or thera-
pies, or postponing biomedical therapies of proven
effectiveness. Indirect harm may be caused by the
financial burden of the alternative therapy, other unan-
ticipated costs (eg, the time investment required to
administer therapy), and feelings of guilt associated
with inability to adhere to rigorous treatment
demands. If a child receiving alternative therapy is at
direct or indirect risk of harm, the pediatrician should
advise against the therapy. In some circumstances, it
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may be necessary for the pediatrician to seek an ethics
consultation or to refer to child welfare agencies. If
there is no risk of direct or indirect harm, a pediatri-
cian should be neutral.9 
To ensure that the animal comes to no harm, the
veterinarian must be even more skillful than the pedi-
atrician in displaying sensitivity to the client and in
deploying Aesculapian authority, as animals do not
have the legal protection children do.
The guidelines also suggest Aesculapian authority-
based discussions of improving quality of life for the
patient. This can mitigate the hopelessness that leads
people to try anything. Directing the family to support
and advocacy groups relevant to the disease in ques-
tion can be of value. In addition, the practitioner
should not be cavalier in dismissing the alternatives
but empathetic and open, not defensive. If the client
insists on adopting an alternative modality, the practi-
tioner should not disengage but offer to assist in mon-
itoring and evaluating the response in a critical but
sympathetic way.
In sum, while one should be careful about using
one’s Aesculapian authority in support of baseless ther-
apies, it is perfectly appropriate to deploy it vigorously
to address the reasons people turn toward alternatives.
Empathetic concern with the uniqueness of the patient
and client situation, reassurance, careful and sensitive
communication, and discussion of quality of life, when
conveyed with Aesculapian authority in an unhurried
personal way, can all help alleviate the client’s powerful
need to seek these elsewhere. More empathy in human
dimensions of medicine may well help to end people’s
desperate search for magic cures.
As Siegler and Osmond1 point out, Aesculapian
authority is the most powerful authority one can have
in society. As animals become increasingly personally
and morally important in society, veterinary
Aesculapian authority will increase. Indeed, as disaf-
fection about human health care increases, veterinary
Aesculapian authority will probably be augmented,
with veterinarians serving as trusted authorities about
medical matters.
Such authority is invaluable in furthering health
but, as we have seen, is subject to inadvertent abuse.
We may hope that increasing practitioner awareness of
Aesculapian authority will help them to use it in a pos-
itive fashion.
aKnight AP, Department of Clinical Sciences, College of Veterinary
Medicine and Biomedical Sciences, Colorado State University, Fort
Collins, Colo: Personal communication, 1999.
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